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Abstract 
We examine whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in Central and Eastern 
Europe reacted differently during a domestic systematic banking crisis and the global financial 
crisis of 2008. Our panel dataset comprises data on more than 400 banks for the period 1994-
2010. Our analysis shows that foreign banks provided credit during domestic banking crises in 
host countries, while government-owned banks contracted. In contrast, foreign-owned banks 
reduced their credit base during the global financial crisis, while government-owned banks 
expanded. Consequently, our results show that foreign-owned banks may contribute to financial 
stability during domestic crisis episodes, but also increase the risk of importing instability from 
abroad during a crisis in their home markets. However, government-owned banks may substitute 
for foreign-owned banks and hinder the transmission of international shocks. Thus, our results 
indicate that a mixed banking sector consisting of foreign-owned and government-owned banks 
is most advisable. 
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1. Introduction 
The large-scale entry of foreign-owned banks into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) began with 
the privatization of government-owned banks in the late 1990s. It resulted in a banking sector of 
which more than 75% was owned by foreign investors at the beginning of the 2000s (Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003). Since that time, the level of foreign ownership remained unchanged in the 
region, but the share of foreign banks still varies from 30% in Slovenia to 99% in the Baltic 
States. The remaining domestic banks are mainly government owned, while private domestic 
banks are small and insignificant in CEE countries (Jackowicz et al., 2012). Until recently, the 
government-owned banks were considered to be inefficient and were thus seen as a burden for 
the banking sector (Bonin et al., 2005). During the recent financial crisis of 2008, however, 
government-owned banks were seen as an important factor in stabilizing the credit level in CEE, 
as multinational banks scaled down their operations or have withdrawn from host countries due 
to problems in their home markets (Kowalewski and Rybinski, 2011). However, whether 
government-owned banks provided stability in CEE countries is still unknown, as the existing 
research so far concentrated mainly on the credit supply of foreign banks due to its prominent 
role in CEE, first during domestic crises and lately during the global financial crisis. However, 
the role of government-owned banks’ credit supply during the global financial crisis was largely 
ignored. Our study attempts to fill this gap and analyse the lending behaviour of government-
owned as well as foreign-owned banks during domestic and global financial crises. 
In the past, foreign bank entry was seen as a positive development in CEE countries, as earlier 
empirical evidence suggested that it leads to greater efficiency within the banking sector (Bonin 
et al., 2005; Drakos, 2003; Fries and Taci, 2005). Additionally, foreign bank entry was 
associated with better access and cheaper credit. Unite and Sullivan (2003) for Asia and 
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) for Latin America documented that foreign banks offered lower 
spreads and have lower costs than domestic banks. In a cross-country study, Clarke et al. (2006) 
showed that enterprises in countries with high levels of foreign bank participation tend to rank 
interest rates and access to long-term loans as lesser constraints on their operations and growth 
than do enterprises in countries with less foreign bank presence. Moreover, de Haas and van 
Lelyveld (2006) found that foreign bank subsidiaries of financially strong parent banks did not 
reduce lending, whereas domestic banks had to do so during domestic banking crises in the CEE 
countries. They associated this occurrence with internal capital markets of multinational parent 
banks that provide subsidiaries with capital and liquidity, which stabilized local lending during a 
crisis in CEE countries. It was assumed, therefore, that high foreign ownership in the banking 
sector induced efficiency and stability in the financial system in CEE countries. 
However, several recent papers indicated that foreign-owned banks may have reduced the credit 
availability in CEE countries during the global crisis of 2008 (Allen et al., 2010). Popov and 
Udell (2012) showed that negative shocks were transmitted from foreign-owned banks to firms 
in CEE during the global crisis. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2011) confirmed that parent banks 
were not significant sources of strength to their subsidiaries during the global crisis. They 
reported that, as a consequence, the slowdown of credit growth of foreign bank subsidiaries was 
almost three times as fast as domestic banks during the global crisis. However, in their study, 
they do not distinguish between private and state-owned domestic banks. At the same time, 
government-owned banks, which are often strongly influenced by political motives, could 
compensate for the decrease of lending by foreign-owned banks during the crisis of 2008.  
In order to study whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in CEE reacted 
differently to domestic and global banking crises, we use a unique database on foreign-owned 
and domestic private and public banks from 10 CEE countries. Our results show that, prior to the 
financial crisis of 2008, foreign-owned banks were increasing the level of credit in CEE 
countries. Moreover, our results confirm that the foreign-owned banks were increasing the level 
of credit during periods of domestic banking crisis in CEE. In contrast, lending of government-
owned banks declined prior to the global financial crisis as well as during domestic crisis. In line 
with our expectations, we document that, during the global financial crisis, government-owned 
banks increased their lending in CEE countries, while the level of lending of foreign-owned bank 
decreased. Moreover, we find also some weak evidence that the lending of the private domestic 
banks declined less than that of foreign banks in CEE countries, which were affected by a 
domestic banking crisis as a result of the global crisis of 2008. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006, 
2011) found that the credit growth of foreign banks in CEE countries is associated with the 
present financial position of the parent banks. However, we do not find any evidence that the 
poor financial performance of the parent banks was directly related to the decline of the lending 
of its subsidiaries in CEE countries during the financial crisis. We find that a more important 
determinant of credit growth than parent banks’ health is bank-specific characteristics such as 
deposit levels or liquidity.  
This paper contributes to several strands of the existing literature. First, we use a new dataset of 
foreign and domestic-owned banks that covers a large number of countries from the CEE region. 
In our study, we are able to control for ownership of all banks in the sector, an ability that 
facilitates our assessment of the validity of the earlier results using only benchmarks for 
domestic banks (De Haas and Lelyveld, 2011). Moreover, our dataset enables us to control for 
ownership of domestically owned and foreign-owned banks. Consequently, we can distinguish 
between private and state-owned banks, a point that has thus far been ignored in the literature. 
Additionally, the existing studies assume that foreign subsidiaries are owned by parent banks 
which, by using internal capital markets, reallocate capital over different geographical regions on 
the basis of expected risks and returns. However, in the last decade, a number of foreign banks 
were opened by non-financial firms, insurance companies, or even individual investors in CEE. 
In the regression we take into account the differences in the ownership of foreign banks and 
control for the parent bank situations in the home market. Our results confirm the earlier findings 
that foreign-owned banks provided stability during domestic banking crises in CEE countries but 
might also transmit financial shocks that affect their home markets through the lending channel 
during a crisis. Second, we expand the literature on multinational banking internal capital and 
lending stability. In contrast to De Haas and Lelyveld (2011), we do not find evidence that the 
slowdown of credit growth of foreign bank subsidiaries during the crisis of 2008 was strongly 
related to the parent banks’ current financial situation. Moreover, we find some evidence that, if 
the global crisis resulted in a domestic banking crisis, then the bank-specific characteristics were 
more important than ownership. Third, we find that the growth of deposits and liquidity was 
strongly related to the lending stability of banks during a local and global financial crisis. 
Henceforth, we confirm that the banking funding structure influences lending stability. 
Consequently, we assume that only those foreign banks that relied more on wholesale funding, 
including parent bank capital, reduced lending in CEE, which is in line with the findings of Allen 
et al. (2010) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. 
Section 3 explains our data and the econometric methodology. Section 4 describes our empirical 
findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Motivation and existing literature 
We build our study on three strands of literature. The first strand reviews the existing evidence 
on a stabilizing effect of foreign banks on the credit supply in host countries during a domestic 
banking crisis. In Mexico and Argentina, Dages et al. (2000) found that foreign banks reported 
notable credit growth during domestic crisis periods and thereafter. Soledad et al. (2005) 
confirmed the results and showed that foreign banks did not reduce their credit supply during 
adverse economic times in Latin America. Additionally, they found some evidence that foreign 
banks viewed crisis periods as opportunities to expand in the host countries. De Haas and van 
Lelyveld (2004) presented similar results for CEE countries. Moreover, in a later paper, de Haas 
and van Lelyveld (2006) showed that, during crisis periods, domestic banks contract their credit 
in CEE. In contrast, they found that greenfield foreign banks play a stabilising role by keeping 
their credit base stable in CEE. These articles lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Foreign banks’ credit growth is relatively insensitive or can even expand during 
host country crisis periods.  
According to Goldberg (2009), an explanation for the results can be twofold. First, foreign-
owned banks are less reliant on host country funding and more reliant on foreign sources than 
their domestically owned counterparts are. Consequently, the procyclicality of their supply of 
loanable funds may be lower, especially during a crisis in the host country. Second, foreign 
banks may have a different client base than domestically owned banks and hence also an altered 
loan demand. Jeon et al. (2006) documented that foreign banks, like domestic banks, were 
procyclical lenders in Korea during the crisis of 1997. They found that, during the Asian crisis, 
foreign banks did not add significant volatility to the financial system, but its lending reacted to 
changing conditions in the home country economy. They showed that whether foreign bank 
operations contributed to financial market stability in Korea depended on the degree of financial 
market integration between Korea and the home country.  
Consequently, the first explanation seems to explain more appropriately why foreign-owned 
banks are insensitive to host-country crisis periods. Hence, the second strand aims at examining 
how a financial crisis in the home country of the parent bank affects the lending of its foreign 
subsidiaries in a host country. Peek and Rosengren (1997) investigated how the collapse of asset 
prices in Japan during the early 1990s affected the operations of Japanese bank subsidiaries 
abroad. They found that the decline in the parents' risk-based capital ratio translated into a 
significant decline in total loans by their U.S. subsidiaries. In line with this evidence, de Haas 
and van Lelyveld (2006) showed that the financial health of the parent bank impacts the ability 
of subsidiaries to expand credit in CEE countries. In a later paper, de Haas and van Lelyveld 
(2010) provided additional evidence for the existence of internal capital markets in multinational 
bank holding companies. They demonstrated that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries 
depends on the financial strength of the parent bank. On the one hand, the existence of internal 
capital markets and the parents’ support for subsidiaries may explain the insensitivity of foreign 
banks’ lending to crises in the host countries. On the other hand, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) 
showed that parent banks, when hit by a funding shock, reallocate liquidity in the organization 
according to a locational pecking order. Foreign subsidiaries that were more important for the 
parent bank were relatively protected from liquidity reallocations, while traditional funding 
locations were used more extensively to buffer shocks to the parent bank balance sheets. As a 
result, multinational banks can contribute to international shock transmission to the host 
countries. De Haas et al. (2012) and Popov and Udell (2012) showed that multinational bank 
subsidiaries cut lending more than domestic banks in the CEE countries during the global 
financial crisis of 2008, while Fungáčová et al. (2013) presented similar results for Russia. In 
addition, Jeon et al. (2013) find evidence that that the transmission of financial shocks varied 
across types of shocks during the financial crisis of 2008. They showed that transmission of the 
shock was the strongest among subsidiaries in CEE countries, followed by Asia and Latin 
America. We formalize these findings in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign banks’ credit growth is negatively related to home country crisis and 
parent bank financial performance.  
The third strand reviews the lending of state-owned banks, which often differs from that of 
private banks. Dinç (2005) presented evidence that state-owned banks increase their lending 
during election years relative to private sector banks. In a similar vein, Jackowicz et al. (2012b) 
found that lending of state-owned banks correlates with the electoral cycle in CEE countries. 
According to Sapienza (2004), the lending of state-owned banks is mainly driven by political 
motives, which pursue interests such as enhancing its chances of re-election or avoiding political 
unrest. Henceforth, the government may use state-owned banks to compensate for market 
failures and limit a credit contraction during a crisis period. Indeed, Micco and Panizza (2006) 
found that the lending of state-owned banks is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the 
lending of private banks, both domestically and foreign owned. Recently, Fungáčová et al. 
(2013) reported in Russia that the credit supply overall diminished during the recent crisis, yet 
this reduction was greater for foreign banks and lower for state-controlled banks relative to 
domestic private banks. Allen et al. ( 2012) found that the largest state-owned and listed Chinese 
banks have significantly out-performed large non-state-owned banks from other emerging 
economies before and during the 2007-2009 crisis. Moreover, they documented that this superior 
performance was not due to less risk-taking by these state-owned banks. Based on this assertion, 
we build the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Government-owned banks increase credit levels in order to compensate for the 
decline of foreign bank lending during home crisis periods.  
Allen et al. (2010) found that, during the global crisis, the reduction in foreign bank lending was 
stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. Moreover, Dages et al. (2000) 
reported that domestically owned and foreign-owned banks with low problem loan ratios behave 
similarly, which suggests that bank health, and not ownership as such, is critical. Similarly, Peek 
and Rosengren (2000) find that domestic and foreign-owned banks exhibited the same lending 
behavior during periods of crisis in Latin America during the 1990s. Similarly, Arena et al. 
(2007) studied the behavior of domestically owned and foreign-owned banks during periods of 
financial distress in 20 Asian and Latin American countries. The results indicated that domestic 
and foreign-owned banks behave roughly similarly during a domestic crisis. These findings lead 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Banks’ financial characteristics are more important in determining credit growth 
than ownership or parent bank financial performance during a host and home crisis period. 
Our paper, which studies banks’ different lending behaviour across the ownership dimension, is 
related to the literature that addresses the effects of foreign bank penetration on credit stability in 
host countries as well as the internal capital market literature. As shown above, empirical studies 
have addressed this question with mixed conclusions. Additionally, so far the literature mostly 
focused on the lending behaviour of foreign banks, yet it is possible that state-owned banks’ 
lending behaviour differs during crisis periods. Hence, our paper examines various roles played 
by foreign and state-owned banks in providing loans during banking crisis periods. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample 
We construct an unbalanced panel dataset using both bank-level and macroeconomic data. The 
bank-level data are from Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. The sample includes 
domestically owned and foreign-owned commercial banks that were operating in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia in the period 1994-2010. We examined the ownership structure of all banks in our 
sample and constructed three ownership dummy variables for each bank in each year. The first 
ownership dummy (Foreign) takes the value of one if the bank is foreign owned and zero for all 
other banks. We use the definition generally applied in the literature and consider a bank as 
foreign owned if at least 50% is owned by foreign entities (Claessens et al., 2001). Similarly, the 
second ownership dummy (Government) takes the value of one if more than 50% of the bank is 
owned by the public sector. The third ownership dummy (Domestic) takes the value of one if a 
private domestic investor owns at least 50% of the bank and zero otherwise. To track ownership 
and changes therein, we use as our primary source the information available in BankScope. We 
complement this information with information from several other sources, including individual 
banks’ websites and annual reports, parent companies’ websites, a banking regulatory agency, 
and central bank websites. We were able to obtain ownership information for all the banks in our 
sample for the entire period in which they were active.  
Using these data, we constructed a panel of 4,344 bank-year observations for 416 banks in 11 
CEE countries. The sample includes 2,264 bank-year observations for foreign-owned banks, 769 
observations for the government-owned banks, and 1,311 observations for banks owned by 
private domestic investors. The panel of domestic and foreign banks covers 1994-2010 but is 
unbalanced as we do not have data for all years for each bank. As banks in our sample use 
different currencies, we convert financial variables into US dollars. 
In addition, we used in the regression a subsample that consists only of multinational bank 
subsidiaries and, following de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010), we controlled for parent banks’ 
financial health. Using ownership data for the foreign banks, we identified 93 parent banks. The 
remaining foreign-owned banks in the sample were controlled either by financial companies as 
insurance and investment funds or non-financial companies as well dispersed shareholders. We 
find that the number of parent banks controlling more than one or two subsidiaries in CEE 
countries is relatively small. We retrieved the needed financial data for parent banks again from 
the BankScope database, and our final sample consists of 1,974 parent-subsidiary-year 
observations, as in some cases the data for the parent banks was missing. 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Our dependent variable is the percentage of real growth in total loans (∆ Loans) of bank i in 
country j in year t. In the regression, we control for the following bank characteristics that may 
influence a bank’s tendency to expand its loan portfolio: ∆Deposits (one period lagged growth in 
total deposits), Liquidity (liquid assets to total assets), Profitability (return on average assets), 
Solvency (equity to assets), and total bank assets to countries GDP as a measure of Size. 
Additionally, in the regression we employ one period of lag real growth in total loans as an 
independent variable. In order to control for parent bank characteristics that may determine 
subsidiaries’ loan growth, we include the following bank-specific measures in the regression as 
independent variables: Solvencyp (parent equity to assets), Profitalbilityp (parent banks return to 
assets), and Sizep (parent bank assets to home countries GDP). The definition of all of the 
variables used in the study is provided in the Appendix.  
De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) reported that an important difference between domestic and 
foreign-owned banks in CEE countries is the reliance of foreign subsidiaries on the money 
market. In their opinion, this difference is based on the fact that foreign banks are on average less 
dependent on local deposits, as they can get financing relatively easily on the money market or 
from the parent bank. As the global financial crisis resulted in a liquidity crunch in the money 
markets as well as many parent banks’ reports of financial losses, the access to local deposits 
may strongly determine the future loan growth of foreign as well as domestic banks. Hence, we 
expect that the credit growth will be strongly influenced by the growth of deposits. 
The existing results showed that banks can resort to liquid assets to finance their lending, and 
hence more liquid banks tend to increase their credit at faster rates (Jeon et al., 2013). 
Additionally, Peek and Rosengren (1997) found that better capitalized banks facilitate faster loan 
growth. However, less liquid banks or undercapitalized banks can be prone to moral hazard and 
rapidly expanding lending (Black and Strahan, 2002). Kishan and Opiela (2000) also found that 
the effects of monetary policy on bank loans depend on bank capitalization and size. They 
showed that undercapitalized and small banks are more responsive to monetary shocks than well-
capitalized and large banks, respectively. As a result, the expected sign of the coefficients for 
these variables is therefore indeterminate. 
In the literature, the mentioned bank-specific characteristics are found to be important 
determinants of banks’ lending behaviour, but the affiliation with a parent bank could also affect 
foreign banks’ credit supply. Houston and James (1998) show that the loan growth of banks 
affiliated with a multi-bank holding company is less sensitive to their cash flow, liquidity, and 
capital positions than in the case of unaffiliated banks. Houston and James (1998) documented 
that affiliated banks are more responsive to local market conditions than their unaffiliated 
counterparts. Based on those results, the researchers suggested that affiliated banks are willing to 
lend in local markets as long as the opportunities are there. Recently, de Haas and van Lelyveld 
(2011) and Jeon et al. (2013) presented that the financial situation and lending behaviour of 
foreign subsidiaries are strongly influenced by the financial situation of the parent banks. Thus, 
the impact of parent banks on foreign bank subsidiaries during a domestic or global crisis is 
ambiguous. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlation coefficients for the main variables across 
domestic and foreign banks in CEE and the parent banks. The descriptive statistics show that 
deposits were growing faster than loans in the years 1994-2010, yet the data presents large 
variability. We find also large variability in the profitability of the banks in CEE countries. 
Moreover, parent banks are characterised by significantly lower profitability and solvency than 
the domestically owned and foreign-owned banks. As expected, we find that the parent banks are 
significantly larger than domestically owned and foreign-owned banks. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the correlations of the main variables used in our study. The results 
overall make good economic sense. We find that deposits’ growth and profitability are positively 
and statistically correlated with banks’ loan growth. In contrast, liquidity and size are negatively 
and statistically significantly correlated with credit growth. Finally, parent banks’ profitability is 
positively related to bank’s loan growth, while solvency is negatively related to it.  
[Table 1] 
Table 2 disaggregates bank characteristics by ownership and shows that the variability among 
domestically owned and foreign-owned banks is statistically significant for the main variables. 
Additionally, we divided our sample in order to establish whether foreign-owned and 
domestically owned banks behaved differently prior to and after the financial crisis of 2008.  
Panel A shows that the variability among domestically owned and foreign-owned banks is 
statistically significant for the main variables during the years 1994-2010. In this period, foreign 
banks provided significantly more loans than domestic banks. In contrast, domestic banks were 
more liquid and had significantly higher equity ratios than foreign-owned banks did. We find 
that the differences in profitability and deposits growth are not statistically significant between 
those two groups of banks. These findings, however, confirm the need to control for these bank 
characteristics in our estimations. 
Panel B shows that, prior to the crisis, credit growth in CEE countries was mainly driven by the 
foreign banks. The difference between the domestically owned and foreign-owned banks is 
significant at the 1% level. While the domestic banks were able to attract more deposits, the 
differences between them and foreign-owned banks is again not statistically significant. Again 
we find that foreign-owned banks prior to the crisis had significantly higher leverage and lower 
liquidity levels than domestic banks.  
Panel C documents that, due to the global crisis, the situation in the CEE countries changed 
significantly. In the crisis period of 2008-2010, domestic banks reported higher real loan growth 
than foreign banks, yet the difference is not statistically significant. In line with previous 
findings, domestic banks had lower leverage ratios and a higher level of liquidity than foreign-
owned banks during the crisis. In contrast to the pervious results, we find the deposit growth was 
higher in foreign-owned banks than in the domestic banks during the crisis, but the differences 
are not statistically significant. Additionally, we find that domestic banks were significantly 
smaller than the foreign banks during the crisis period. Finally, in opposition to the previous 
results, we find also that the domestic banks showed higher profitability than the foreign-owned 
banks, yet again the difference is not significant. 
 [Table 2] 
3.2 Methodology 
The relationship between loan growth, bank-specific characteristics, and crisis is evaluated using 
the following specification: 
∆ܮ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଴ܤ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵܪ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the real credit growth of bank i in year t; Bi,t represents variables 
controlling for characteristic of banks i, including lagged credit growth, and an ownership 
dummy variable for foreign and government-owned banks; Hi,t is set of host-country 
macroeconomic variables; Ci,t refers to a crisis dummy. When we use the subsample of 
multinational bank subsidiaries, Pi,t represents variables controlling for parent bank 
characteristics. 
We employ country GDP growth and inflation rate as country macroeconomic variables 
reflecting the attractiveness of expanding credit in CEE country. Albertazzi and Gambacorta 
(2009) show that the economic cycle influences banks’ profits through net interest income (via 
lending activity) and loan loss provisions (via credit portfolio quality). We expect therefore that 
banks are positively and relatively strongly related to countries’ GDP growth. We are aware that, 
to identify credit supply during a banking crisis, while appropriately controlling for demand 
conditions, we need to employ more reliable measures, yet such indicators are difficult to find. 
Henceforth, we interpret GDP growth only as a rough proxy for loan demand condition in a CEE 
country. We assume a negative sign for the variable Inflation as higher inflation tends to reflect 
unstable macroeconomic conditions in the CEE country. Moreover, Boyd et al. (2001) show that 
inflation may worsen market friction and force banks to ration credits. 
We include a crisis dummy, Crisis, which takes on the value of one for years in which the host 
(or home) country experienced a systematic banking crisis. We identify the years of the domestic 
systematic banking crisis in a particular country using the Laeven and Valencia (2012) database. 
Furthermore, we employ a crisis dummy for global financial crisis in the years 2008-2010. 
Additionally, in the regressions we observe the interaction between the ownership variables and 
the crisis dummies.  
As foreign banks’ subsidiaries are often financially supported and may use bank crises in the 
host country to increase their market position, we anticipate a positive coefficient for the 
interaction term between Crisisd dummy for domestic crisis and Foreign. In contrast, we expect 
a negative coefficient for the interaction term between Crisisg dummy for global crisis and 
Foreign, as foreign subsidiaries could not rely on parent bank support and were often cut off 
from the internal and external interbank market. Moreover, we expect a negative sign for the 
global banking crisis dummy Crisisg as banks, regardless of their ownership structure, had to 
slow credit growth during the crisis as a result of the increasing risk. However, we assume that 
the government-owned banks increased their lending during the global crisis in order to stabilize 
the economy. Consequently, we anticipate a positive coefficient for the interaction term between 
Crisisg dummy for global crisis and Government. While our prediction about the lending 
behaviour of government-owned banks during domestic crisis is ambiguous, we employ three 
estimation methods for the panel regression: fixed effects, random effects, and a dynamic GMM 
panel estimator. We employ the fixed effects estimation based on Hausmann’s test, but it may 
not be appropriate for our analysis, as the interesting variables are bank ownership dummies, 
which tend to remain stable in countries. Although they do change over time, the variations are 
not significant enough to be significant. Fixed-effect estimation, however, requires significant 
within-group variations in the independent variable so as to generate a consistent and efficient 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). Henceforth, the fixed-effect estimator is prone to give us an 
imprecise coefficient on bank ownership variables. Moreover, fixed effects can aggravate the 
problem of multicollinearity (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, we employ additionally a random-effect 
model for estimation. Furthermore, we employ the GMM System estimator, since lagged credit 
growth may be correlated with the panel-level effects, and therefore there is a risk that our 
estimator is inconsistent (Nickell, 1981). The appropriateness of the set of instruments is 
formally evaluated by the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test 
for error autocorrelation. We compute the Sargan test using the two-step GMM System estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Additionally, when we employ the subsample of multinational banks 
subsidiaries in the regressions, we correct for the small sample error (Roodman, 2009). For all 
models discussed in the following subsection, the Sargan test and the Arellano–Bond AR(2) tests 
show that our instruments are appropriate and no second-order serial correlation is detected, 
respectively. In all regressions, the independent variables are jointly significant at levels below 
1%. Hence, we do not make additional comments on those aspects of the estimates. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline results 
In Table 3 we present the baseline results on determinants of bank lending in CEE countries 
during the years 1996-2010. The results confirm that deposits’ growth is positively correlated 
with credit growth. The coefficient for deposit growth is positive and significant in all the 
regressions at 1% level. Moreover, the coefficient for profitability is positive and also highly 
significant in all regressions. In contrast, we find that the coefficient for liquidity is negative and 
significant, which could mean that more conservative banks grow more slowly. 
In specifications (4)-(6) we include the ownership dummies and find that foreign banks supply 
more loans than government-owned banks. The coefficient for Government dummy is negative, 
yet insignificant. In contrast, we find that the coefficient for Foreign dummy is positive and 
significant in two specifications. Henceforth, our results confirm that foreign-owned banks 
fuelled the credit growth in the CEE countries. 
Specifications (7)-(9) show the results for the subsample of multinational bank subsidiaries. The 
results for the foreign bank subsidiaries are similar to the full sample. We find that deposits’ 
growth and profitability are positively correlated with loan growth, while the coefficient for 
subsidiaries’ liquidity is negative and significant again. Hence, the results show that 
multinational bank subsidiaries’ lending is determined by the same bank-specific factors as for 
all the foreign banks and state-owned banks. Additionally, we find only weak evidence that the 
parent banks’ characteristics determine the lending growth of the subsidiaries in CEE. Only the 
coefficient for parent bank liquidity is positive and significant, but just in two specifications and 
at the 10% level. Thus, the results provide weak evidence that foreign subsidiaries of parent 
banks with higher level of liquidity are more prone to aggressive lending abroad. 
The coefficients for the macroeconomic control variables are in line with our expectations. We 
find that economic growth is positively and statistical correlated with loan growth. In contrast, 
the coefficient for inflation is negative and significant in all specifications. 
[Table 3] 
4.2. Domestic banking crisis 
Table 4 shows the determinants of bank lending during a domestic systematic banking crisis in 
CEE countries. In order to control for the domestic systematic banking crisis, we include a 
dummy Crisisd that takes the value 1 for the years of systematic banking crisis in a particular 
CEE country and zero otherwise.  
The coefficients for banks’ specific characteristics are in line with our main results. The 
coefficients for deposits’ growth and profitability are again positive and statistically significant, 
while the coefficient for liquidity is negative and statistically significant. The ownership dummy 
for government-owned banks is again insignificant, and for foreign-owned banks it is positive 
but statistically significant only in two specifications. 
In line with the expectation, the crisis dummy is negative, but only significant in two 
specifications. One explanation why the credit level did not decline significantly in CEE 
countries during a domestic banking crisis is that the loan supply was stabilized by foreign 
banks. We test Hypothesis 1 formally and observe the interaction between the crisis dummy with 
the ownership variables. Specifications 7-9 show that the interaction term between Crisisd and 
Foreign is positive and significant in all specifications at 1%. Henceforth, the results confirm the 
existing results and document that foreign-owned banks stabilize lending during domestic crisis 
in CEE countries. We find that the coefficient for the interaction term between Crisisd and 
Government is negative, but insignificant. Hence, we do not find any evidence that government-
owned banks reduced lending during domestic banking crises. However, we may assume that the 
state-owned banks’ credit level deteriorated due to the problems in the economy and the weak 
support of the government. 
The macroeconomic control variables are consistent with the prior findings. In all specifications, 
the coefficient for economic growth is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient 
for inflation is negative and remains significant in all specifications. 
[Table 4] 
In Table 5 we present the results for the subsample of the multinational bank subsidiaries. As 
above, we find that bank deposits’ growth and profitability are positively correlated with loan 
growth. In contrast, the coefficient for liquidity is again negative and significant. In line with 
previous results, we find only weak evidence that parent characteristics determine loan growth of 
multinational bank subsidiaries. The coefficient for solvency is positive and statistically 
significant, but only in two specifications. 
As expected, the coefficient for domestic systematic banks crisis is positively correlated with 
multinational bank lending, but it is insignificant. Henceforth, the results document that foreign 
banks’ lending is not affected by local banking crisis in a particular host country. Moreover, we 
observe the interaction between the Crisisd dummy with the parent-bank-specific variables and 
find that none of the coefficients for the interaction terms is statistical significant. Therefore, we 
assume that multinational bank subsidiaries that increased lending were not especially supported 
by their parent banks during domestic banking crises in CEE countries.  
The macroeconomic control variables are again consistent with the main results. In all 
specifications, the coefficient for economic growth is positive and statistically significant, while 
the coefficient for inflation is negative and also statistically significant. 
[Table 5] 
4.3.Global banking crisis 
In Table 6 we present the results for the determinants of bank lending in CEE countries during 
the global financial crisis of 2008. In order to control for the recent financial crisis, we include a 
dummy variable, Crisisg, which takes the value of 1 for the years 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. 
In line with the main results, we find that deposits’ growth and profitability are positively and 
significantly associated with loan growth. In contrast, we find again that liquidity is negatively 
associated with banks’ loan growth. Similarly, the coefficient for foreign ownership is positive 
and significant in almost all specifications, while the coefficient for state ownership is negative 
but insignificant. Henceforth, the results show again that foreign banks increased their lending 
during the period of investigation. As before, we find that the dummy, Crisisg is negatively 
related to bank lending, but the coefficient is significant only in two specifications.  
We again interact the global crisis dummy with the ownership variables. In contrast to the 
previous results, we find that the coefficient for the interaction dummy Crisisg and Foreign is 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications at least at the 5% level. Consequently, 
we do find that Hypothesis 2 is supported as foreign banks decreased their lending in CEE 
countries during the financial crisis of 2008. In contrast, we find that the interaction dummies 
Crisisg and Government are positive and statistically significant in two specifications at least at 
the 5% level. The results support Hypothesis 3, as we find evidence that the government-owned 
banks substituted the loan supply for foreign-owned subsidiaries during the global financial 
crisis. We may assume that, in the CEE countries where government-owned banks still have a 
significant market share in some of the banking sectors, the financial crisis was less severe, as 
they hampered the decline of lending by foreign banks, which were affected by the crisis through 
their parent companies. The existence of the substitution effect confirms the coefficient for the 
dummy Crisisg, which is negative but statistically significant only in two of the nine 
specifications at the 5% level, while, the macroeconomic control variables are again similar to 
those in Table 3.  
[Table 6] 
The results in Table 7 document that foreign banks, which are strongly affected by the global 
crisis, are those owned by the multinational banks. In contrast to the results in Table 6, we find 
that the coefficient for the dummy Crisisg is negative and highly statistically significant in all 
specifications. However, when we interact the crisis dummy with the parent-specific variables, 
none is statistically significant. Hence, the results show that multinational banks’ subsidiaries 
reduced credit growth regardless of the financial standing of their parent bank during the 
financial crisis of 2008. Moreover, we find that the level of reduction of credit growth is mainly 
associated with the current financial situation of the foreign subsidiary as the coefficient for 
deposits’ growth is positive and significant in almost all the specifications at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the coefficient for profitability is positive and significant in almost all specifications, 
while the coefficients for liquidity are negative and significant. Henceforth, the results confirm 
that multinational banks’ foreign subsidiaries lending was rather associated with its current 
financial situation than its parent banks during the global crisis. 
The results support Hypothesis 4, which states that the bank-specific characteristics are more 
important than parent bank health during home crisis periods. Allen et al. (2011) presented 
evidence that some foreign subsidiaries supported their parent banks during a global crisis. The 
financial transfers from subsidiaries to parent banks may explain the significant decline of 
lending of the foreign subsidiaries during the crisis.  
[Table 7] 
4.4. Domestic and global banking crisis 
In the last regressions, we decided to employ a Crisisd,g dummy that takes the value of one if the 
particular country experienced a domestic systematic banking crisis during the global financial 
crisis of 2008. Controlling for host and home crisis periods at the same time enables us to 
determine whether banks’ financial characteristics are more important in determining credit 
growth than ownership or parent bank health during a crisis period. 
The results in Table 8 are in line with our previous finding that shows that credit growth is 
positively associated with deposits’ growth and the profitability of banks. In contrast, the results 
show again that the banks’ liquidity is negatively associated with banks’ loan growth. As 
previously, the coefficient for the foreign ownership of banks is positive and statistically 
significant in the fixed and random effects models, while the coefficient for the government 
ownership of banks is negative but insignificant. Henceforth, the results indicate again that 
foreign-owned banks significantly increased lending in CEE countries prior to the crisis. 
In contrast to the previous results, we find that the coefficient for Crisisd,g is positive and 
statistically significant. At the same time, the coefficients for the interaction Crisisd,g and 
Foreign as well Crisisd,g and Government are insignificant. Those results support Hypothesis 4 
that states that the banks’ characteristics are more important in explaining the level of credit 
supply during a financial crisis. However, another explanation for our results may be that, during 
a domestic systematic banking crisis in the period of the global financial crisis, both foreign-
owned and government-owned banks had to decrease lending, but for different reasons. As a 
result, only domestic private banks were able to sustain or even increase relatively the level of 
lending, and therefore the coefficient for crisis is positive, while the interaction dummies are 
negative but insignificant. Again, we find that the control variables are consistent with those in 
Table 3. 
[Table 8] 
Table 9 shows the results of the determinant of credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries 
during a domestic systematic banking crisis in the period of the financial crisis of 2008. The 
results confirm that foreign bank subsidiaries’ credit growth is strongly associated with bank-
specific characteristics, as coefficients for deposit growth, profitability, and liquidity are positive 
and statistically significant. In contrast to the previous results, the coefficient for Crisisd,g is 
positive but statistically significant only in two specifications. We may assume, henceforth, that 
the multinational bank subsidiaries’ lending decline was relatively lower than for other banks 
during the domestic systematic banking crisis in the period of the financial crisis. 
In line with the previous results, we do not find strong evidence that parent banks’ characteristics 
are associated with subsidiaries’ credit growth. Only the coefficient for parent banks’ solvency is 
positive, but is only statistically significant in two specifications at the 10% level. However, in 
contrast to the other results, the interaction terms Crisisd,g and Sizeparent are negative and 
statistically significant in two specifications. Hence, the results show that subsidiaries of smaller 
multinational banks were more likely to reduce credit growth during a domestic crisis in the 
period of the global financial crisis. 
In contrast to the previous results, the coefficient for inflation is only statistically significant in 
two of the specifications, but its sign remains unchanged, while the coefficient for GDP growth 
remains positive and highly statistically significant in all specifications. 
 [Table 9] 
5. Conclusions 
The recent literature has investigated foreign banks’ lending activities during the global financial 
crisis and previously during crisis periods in host countries. This paper extends the question, 
asking if ownership determines banks’ behaviour during domestic and global crises. If so, is 
there a difference between government-owned versus foreign-owned banks’ reactions to banking 
crises? In our investigation, we specifically concentrate on loan growth and domestic and global 
financial crisis. To carry out our analysis, we utilize financial and ownership data on all 
commercial banks from 11 CEE countries over the period of 1994-2010. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We observe that domestic and global banking crisis 
significantly affect government-owned and foreign-owned bank lending behaviour. During 
domestic banking crises in CEE countries, foreign-owned banks’ credit levels remained constant 
or even increased. In contrast, we find weak evidence that the government-owned banks’ lending 
declined during the domestic crisis. This decline can be attributed to the worsening situation of 
the state, which was strongly affected by the domestic crisis. In contrast, we find that, during the 
global financial crisis, the lending of foreign-owned banks declined. However, we do not find 
conclusive evidence that parent banks’ financial situation determines foreign subsidiaries’ 
lending, as claimed in earlier research. In line with our expectations, however, we find that the 
government-owned banks’ lending increased during the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Consequently, the government-owned banks compensated for the decline of foreign-owned 
banks and provided stability to the financial systems in CEE during the financial crisis of 2008. 
Nevertheless, we find that, during periods when the domestic banking sector was affected by the 
global financial crisis of 2008, the lending of government-owned banks also declined. However, 
we find some weak evidence that domestic private banks compensated for this downturn. 
Moreover, the decline in lending of government-owned banks relative to foreign banks 
subsidiaries was larger. As a result, we find that domestic private and foreign-owned banks also 
provided financial stability in some of the CEE countries during the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, we find that the bank-specific characteristics are more important than ownership in 
explaining the supply of credit during a financial crisis. In periods of simultaneous host and 
home financial crisis, only the bank characteristics of profitability, liquidity, and deposit growth 
were important in explaining the lending behaviour in CEE countries. 
Our results are quite important from a policy point of view, as we show that a mixed 
composition within the banking sector is advisable, consisting of government-owned, private 
domestic, and foreign-owned banks. In addition, we find that bank-specific characteristics are 
important in explaining credit growth during periods of financial troubles. Henceforth, 
supervisory organizations should not only concentrate on keeping a mixed-ownership structure 
of the banking sector, but also control the financial situation of the domestic and foreign banks in 
the sector. 
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Appendix  
Explanatory variables and their definitions  
Variable Definition 
∆Loans Real growth rate of loans from non-financial entities 
∆Deposits Real growth rate of deposits from non-financial entities 
Liquidity Liquid assets over total assets 
Profitability Ratio of  gross profit to total assets  
Solvency Ratio of equity capital to total assets  
Size Ratio of a given bank's assets and the GDP of the country in which the bank is licensed 
Government Binary variable identifying banks that were directly or indirectly controlled by the government in a given year 
Foreign Binary variable identifying banks that were owned by foreign investors in a given year 
Profitability Ratio of gross profit to total assets calculated for parent banks 
Solvency Ratio of equity capital to total assets calculated for parent banks  
Size Ratio of a given parent bank's assets and the GDP of the country in which the bank is licensed 
Crisisd 
Binary variable equal to one for the years of systemic banking crisis in a 
particular country and zero otherwise. 
Crisisg Binary variable equal to one for the years 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. 
Crisisd,g 
Binary variable equal to one if there was a systemic banking crisis in a 
particular country during the years 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. 
GDP Growth Real GDP growth 
Inflation Log of Consumer Price Index 
 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 ∆Loans ∆Depostis Liquidity Profitability Solvency Size Profitabiltyparent Solvencyparent Sizeparent 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 0.213 0.273 0.154 0.012 0.146 0.031 0.002 0.056 0.143 
Std. Dev. 0.411 0.427 0.136 0.030 0.134 0.055 0.010 0.040 0.232 
Obs. 3626 3370 3600 3822 4253 3995 4342 1974 4230 
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations (N= 2318) 
∆Loans 1         
∆Deposits  0.472*** 1        
Liquidity -0.110*** -0.080*** 1       
Profitability  0.175*** 0.184***  0.006 1      
Solvency  0.019  -0.031* -0.108***     0.109*** 1     
Size -0.067*** -0.079*** 0.112*** 0.008 -0.202*** 1    
Profitabiltyparent  0.035**   0.022 -0.065*** 0.000 -0.054*** 0.014 1   
Solvencyparent -0.047*  -0.018 -0.135*** 0.028  0.187*** -0.036 0.210*** 1  
Sizeparent -0.009 -0.057*** -0.014 -0.021 -0.170*** 0.217*** 0.164*** -0.248*** 1 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2 
Means difference test between variables of domestic banks and foreign-owned banks 
 Domestic Foreign   
 Mean N Μean N difference t-value 
Panel A: Sample Period 1994-2010 
∆Loans 0.188 1692 0.235 1934 -0.466 -3.412 
∆Deposits 0.283 1592 0.265 1778 0.018 1.254 
Liquidity 0.170 1704 0.140 1896 0.030 6.585 
Profitability 0.125 1777 0.011 2045 0.001 1.054 
Solvency 0.161 2033 0.132 2220 0.029 7.140 
Size 0.030 1958 0.033 2037 -0.004 -2.054 
Panel B: Sample Period 1994-2007 
∆Loans 0.205 1480 0.287 1494 -0.8214 -5.236 
∆Deposits 0.300 1461 0.291 1492 0.009 0.560 
Liquidity 0.171 1561 0.140 1598 0.031 6.400 
Profitability 0.137 1556 0.141 1582 -0.000 -0.415 
Solvency 0.163 1806 0.136 1752 0.027 5.894 
Size 0.029 1740 0.029 1588 -0.000 -0.007 
Panel C: Sample Period 2008-2010 
∆Loans 0.071 212 0.057 440 0.014 0.650 
∆Deposits 0.095 131 0.127 286 -0.032 -0.930 
Liquidity 0.158 143 0.138 298 0.020 1.332 
Profitability 0.003 221 0.002 463 0.002 0.769 
Solvency 0.141 227 0.115 468 0.026 3.036 
Size 0.035 218 0.049 449 -0.013 -2.574 
 
 
Table 3 
Determinants of bank lending in Central European countries 
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆Loans -0.004 0.034 0.116*** -0.010 0.031 0.114*** -0.057* 0.067** 0.072** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) 
∆Deposit 0.433*** 0.447*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.445*** 0.427*** 0.490*** 0.523*** 0.479*** 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038) (0.049) 
Liquidity -0.327*** -0.219*** -0.286*** -0.326*** -0.214*** -0.280*** -0.341** -0.032 -0.177** 
 (0.101) (0.070) (0.076) (0.102) (0.070) (0.077) (0.138) (0.066) (0.086) 
Profitability 2.333*** 2.202*** 1.540*** 2.360*** 2.188*** 1.526*** 1.459** 0.822 0.683 
 (0.427) (0.368) (0.337) (0.429) (0.371) (0.339) (0.637) (0.502) (0.558) 
Solvency -0.044 -0.140 -0.139 -0.083 -0.131 -0.129 0.040 0.017 0.040 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.102) (0.159) (0.143) (0.106) (0.364) (0.234) (0.211) 
Size -0.430 -0.210 -0.045 -0.393 -0.216 -0.055 0.394 -0.126 0.059 
(0.323) (0.134) (0.097) (0.297) (0.138) (0.098) (0.398) (0.147) (0.145) 
Government    -0.034 -0.005 0.001    
   (0.037) (0.028) (0.021)    
Foreign    0.072** 0.037* 0.021    
   (0.035) (0.021) (0.016)    
Profitabilityparent       -2.340* -0.452 -0.814 
       (1.207) (0.645) (0.812) 
Solvencyparent        4.813* 2.231 3.949* 
       (2.563) (1.818) (2.198) 
Sizeparent       0.037 -0.025 -0.040 
       (0.104) (0.038) (0.047) 
GDP growth 1.424*** 1.313*** 1.102*** 1.444*** 1.330*** 1.112*** 1.032*** 0.810*** 0.758** 
 (0.230) (0.252) (0.257) (0.229) (0.253) (0.258) (0.345) (0.299) (0.326) 
Inflation -0.191*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.186*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -1.283*** -1.082*** -1.320***
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) (0.362) (0.316) (0.333) 
Constant 0.146** 0.151** 0.141*** 0.110** 0.147** 0.127*** 0.664*** 0.277* 0.205*** 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.035) (0.047) (0.068) (0.038) (0.148) (0.143) (0.074) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 1092 1092 1092 
R2overall 0.366 0.386  0.359 0.387  0.394 0.489  
R2between 0.347 0.406  0.319 0.397  0.270 0.603  
R2within 0.353 0.350  0.357 0.353  0.460 0.436  
Hausman 0.000   0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.111   0.113   0.544 
Hansen J   0.166   0.174   0.406 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
  
Table 4 
Determinants of goverment and foreign bank lending during domestic banking crisis  
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆Loans -0.004 0.034 0.114*** -0.010 0.031 0.113*** -0.009 0.032 0.115*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) 
∆Deposit 0.433*** 0.447*** 0.427*** 0.428*** 0.445*** 0.426*** 0.428*** 0.446*** 0.427*** 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) 
Liquidity -0.327*** -0.219*** -0.289*** -0.327*** -0.214*** -0.283*** -0.337*** -0.217*** -0.286***
 (0.101) (0.070) (0.076) (0.102) (0.070) (0.077) (0.100) (0.069) (0.076) 
Profitability 2.334*** 2.198*** 1.540*** 2.360*** 2.184*** 1.529*** 2.280*** 2.079*** 1.463*** 
 (0.428) (0.367) (0.336) (0.430) (0.370) (0.339) (0.426) (0.365) (0.337) 
Solvency -0.045 -0.141 -0.145 -0.082 -0.132 -0.136 -0.053 -0.119 -0.128 
 (0.158) (0.142) (0.102) (0.158) (0.143) (0.105) (0.157) (0.140) (0.102) 
Size -0.428 -0.207 -0.041 -0.393 -0.214 -0.053 -0.408 -0.182 -0.016 
(0.324) (0.134) (0.097) (0.299) (0.137) (0.099) (0.307) (0.137) (0.099) 
Government    -0.034 -0.005 0.003 -0.026 0.005 0.010 
    (0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.041) (0.030) (0.023) 
Foreign    0.072** 0.037* 0.021 0.055 0.018 0.003 
    (0.036) (0.021) (0.016) (0.036) (0.021) (0.017) 
Crisisd -0.004 -0.010 -0.044 0.001 -0.008 -0.044 -0.061* -0.066 -0.116***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) 
Government x Crisisd       0.016 -0.012 0.013 
       (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) 
Foreign x Crisisd       0.125*** 0.134*** 0.153*** 
       (0.045) (0.048) (0.046) 
GDP growth 1.406*** 1.269*** 0.949*** 1.450*** 1.295*** 0.960*** 1.460*** 1.318*** 0.960*** 
 (0.243) (0.270) (0.282) (0.244) (0.270) (0.283) (0.249) (0.270) (0.284) 
Inflation -0.190*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.187*** -0.177*** -0.179*** -0.181*** -0.168*** -0.173***
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.022) (0.035) (0.025) (0.022) (0.035) (0.025) (0.022) 
Constant 0.147** -0.233*** 0.138*** 0.111** 0.149** 0.124*** 0.120** 0.149** 0.132*** 
 (0.058) (0.086) (0.035) (0.047) (0.068) (0.038) (0.047) (0.067) (0.038) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 
R2overall 0.366 0.386  0.359 0.386  0.363 0.391  
R2between 0.348 0.407  0.318 0.397  0.329 0.413  
R2within 0.353 0.350  0.357 0.352  0.359 0.355  
Hausman 0.426   0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.118   0.119   0.115 
Hansen J   0.184   0.193   0.203 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of foreign bank subsidiaries lending during domestic banking crisis  
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Loans -0.056* 0.068** 0.073** -0.054* 0.067** 0.072* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) 
∆Deposit 0.492*** 0.524*** 0.480*** 0.493*** 0.524*** 0.481*** 
(0.044) (0.038) (0.049) (0.044) (0.038) (0.049) 
Liquidity -0.343** -0.025 -0.171** -0.352** -0.026 -0.170** 
 (0.135) (0.066) (0.086) (0.135) (0.066) (0.086) 
Profitability 1.386** 0.780 0.666 1.353** 0.780 0.692 
 (0.636) (0.501) (0.555) (0.656) (0.502) (0.558) 
Solvency 0.079 0.037 0.059 0.050 0.045 0.056 
 (0.361) (0.233) (0.211) (0.366) (0.234) (0.214) 
Size 0.345 -0.129 0.053 0.352 -0.121 0.057 
(0.419) (0.148) (0.145) (0.420) (0.148) (0.148) 
Crisisd 0.043 0.049 0.044 0.056 0.014 0.056 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.124) (0.089) (0.087) 
Profitabilityparent -2.265* -0.452 -0.817 -1.970 -0.693 -0.882 
(1.207) (0.640) (0.810) (1.321) (0.744) (0.986) 
Solvencyparent  4.760* 2.312 4.006* 3.367 2.872 3.992 
 (2.539) (1.792) (2.189) (2.429) (2.110) (2.533) 
Sizeparent 0.039 -0.019 -0.034 0.025 -0.017 -0.025 
 (0.105) (0.038) (0.047) (0.105) (0.040) (0.048) 
Profitabilityparent 
 x Crisisd 
   -1.521 0.923 0.266 
   (2.707) (1.443) (1.413) 
Solvencyparent  
x Crisisd 
   9.630 -1.375 0.405 
   (6.788) (3.188) (4.198) 
Sizeparent x Crisisd    0.096 -0.017 -0.098 
    (0.106) (0.111) (0.096) 
GDP growth 1.179*** 1.004*** 0.866** 1.140*** 1.062*** 0.836** 
 (0.353) (0.314) (0.347) (0.319) (0.314) (0.342) 
Inflation -1.265*** -1.057*** -1.278*** -1.291*** -1.062*** -1.279***
 (0.364) (0.316) (0.336) (0.362) (0.316) (0.338) 
Constant 0.631*** 0.261* 0.201*** 0.637*** 0.265* 0.200** 
 (0.151) (0.142) (0.074) (0.156) (0.143) (0.081) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
R2overall 0.398 0.489  0.388 0.490  
R2between 0.286 0.610  0.226 0.620  
R2within 0.461 0.43  0.464 0.436  
Hausman 0.000    0.000  
AR2   0.493   0.518 
Hansen J   0.399   0.454 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 6 
Determinants of goverment and foreign bank lending during global financial crisis  
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆Loans -0.004 0.034 0.116*** -0.010 0.031 0.114*** -0.010 0.031 0.113*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) 
∆Deposit 0.433*** 0.447*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.445*** 0.427*** 0.428*** 0.445*** 0.426*** 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) 
Liquidity -0.327*** -0.219*** -0.286*** -0.326*** -0.214*** -0.280*** -0.330*** -0.216*** -0.285***
 (0.101) (0.070) (0.076) (0.102) (0.070) (0.077) (0.102) (0.069) (0.076) 
Profitability 2.333*** 2.202*** 1.540*** 2.360*** 2.188*** 1.526*** 2.357*** 2.175*** 1.520*** 
 (0.427) (0.368) (0.337) (0.429) (0.371) (0.339) (0.430) (0.370) (0.340) 
Solvency -0.044 -0.140 -0.139 -0.083 -0.131 -0.129 -0.068 -0.142 -0.144 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.102) (0.159) (0.143) (0.106) (0.164) (0.142) (0.105) 
Size -0.430 -0.210 -0.045 -0.393 -0.216 -0.055 -0.368 -0.201 -0.040 
(0.323) (0.134) (0.097) (0.297) (0.138) (0.098) (0.289) (0.138) (0.097) 
Government    -0.034 -0.005 0.001 -0.030 -0.012 -0.010 
    (0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.038) (0.029) (0.022) 
Foreign    0.072** 0.037* 0.021 0.085** 0.048** 0.032* 
    (0.035) (0.021) (0.016) (0.037) (0.023) (0.018) 
Crisisg -0.065 0.011 -0.095** -0.116** -0.079 -0.094** -0.084 -0.059 -0.063 
(0.050) (0.056) (0.045) (0.054) (0.050) (0.045) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) 
Government x Crisisg       0.109 0.126** 0.139*** 
       (0.071) (0.059) (0.053) 
Foreign x Crisisg       -0.073*** -0.061** -0.067** 
       (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
GDP growth 1.424*** 1.313*** 1.102*** 1.444*** 1.330*** 1.112*** 1.440*** 1.321*** 1.103*** 
 (0.230) (0.252) (0.257) (0.229) (0.253) (0.258) (0.223) (0.253) (0.253) 
Inflation -0.191*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.186*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -0.187*** -0.177*** -0.182***
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) 
Constant 0.146** 0.151** 0.236*** 0.154** 0.147** 0.221*** 0.149** 0.150** 0.218*** 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.041) (0.061) (0.068) (0.044) (0.062) (0.068) (0.045) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 
R2overall 0.366 0.386  0.359 0.387  0.363 0.390  
R2between 0.347 0.406  0.319 0.396  0.320 0.397  
R2within 0.353 0.350  0.359 0.352  0.360 0.356  
Hausman 0.000   0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.111   0.113   0.114 
Hansen J   0.166   0.174   0.207 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 7 
Determinants of foreign bank subsidiaries lending during global financial crisis 
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Loans -0.057* 0.067** 0.072** -0.058* 0.067** 0.071* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) 
∆Deposit 0.490*** 0.523*** 0.479*** 0.489*** 0.523*** 0.478*** 
(0.044) (0.038) (0.049) (0.044) (0.038) (0.049) 
Liquidity -0.341** -0.032 -0.177** -0.342** -0.033 -0.176** 
 (0.138) (0.066) (0.086) (0.138) (0.066) (0.087) 
Profitability 1.459** 0.822 0.683 1.506** 0.819 0.689 
 (0.637) (0.502) (0.558) (0.624) (0.502) (0.558) 
Solvency 0.040 0.017 0.040 0.020 0.016 0.033 
 (0.364) (0.234) (0.211) (0.364) (0.234) (0.212) 
Size 0.394 -0.126 0.059 0.383 -0.127 0.055 
(0.398) (0.147) (0.145) (0.399) (0.147) (0.144) 
Crisisg -0.469*** -0.306*** -0.161*** -0.443*** -0.319** -0.213* 
 (0.126) (0.110) (0.058) (0.158) (0.134) (0.115) 
Profitabilityparent -2.340* -0.452 -0.814 -2.199 -0.757 -1.197 
(1.207) (0.645) (0.812) (1.358) (0.939) (1.225) 
Solvencyparent  4.813* 2.231 3.949* 5.655* 4.211 5.856* 
 (2.563) (1.818) (2.198) (3.144) (2.829) (3.300) 
Sizeparent 0.037 -0.025 -0.040 0.028 -0.027 -0.048 
 (0.104) (0.038) (0.047) (0.107) (0.044) (0.055) 
Profitabilityparent 
 x Crisisg 
   -0.491 0.315 0.764 
   (1.658) (1.184) (1.390) 
Solvencyparent  
x Crisisg 
   -2.222 -4.136 -4.254 
   (4.108) (3.278) (3.711) 
Sizeparent 
 x Crisisg 
   0.018 0.007 0.038 
   (0.094) (0.072) (0.084) 
GDP growth 1.032*** 0.810*** 0.758** 0.980*** 0.783*** 0.741** 
 (0.345) (0.299) (0.326) (0.308) (0.278) (0.313) 
Inflation -1.283*** -1.082*** -1.320*** -1.309*** -1.101*** -1.331***
 (0.362) (0.316) (0.333) (0.364) (0.318) (0.334) 
Constant 0.664*** 0.475*** 0.366*** 0.664*** 0.484*** 0.379*** 
 (0.148) (0.125) (0.079) (0.149) (0.127) (0.090) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
R2overall 0.394 0.488  0.395 0.490  
R2between 0.270 0.603  0.273 0.614  
R2within 0.460 0.436  0.461 0.437  
Hausman 0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.544   0.526 
Hansen J   0.406   0.429 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 8 
Determinants of goverment and foreign bank lending during a domestic and global banking crisis   
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆Loans -0.004 0.034 0.115*** -0.010 0.030 0.113*** -0.011 0.031 0.113*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) 
∆Deposit 0.432*** 0.446*** 0.428*** 0.427*** 0.444*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.444*** 0.427*** 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) 
Liquidity -0.324*** -0.217*** -0.286*** -0.324*** -0.212*** -0.280*** -0.324*** -0.209*** -0.278***
 (0.101) (0.069) (0.075) (0.102) (0.069) (0.076) (0.102) (0.069) (0.076) 
Profitability 2.329*** 2.188*** 1.536*** 2.357*** 2.174*** 1.522*** 2.364*** 2.172*** 1.523*** 
 (0.427) (0.366) (0.337) (0.429) (0.369) (0.339) (0.430) (0.369) (0.339) 
Solvency -0.046 -0.138 -0.137 -0.085 -0.129 -0.126 -0.087 -0.128 -0.125 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.102) (0.159) (0.143) (0.106) (0.160) (0.143) (0.106) 
Size -0.441 -0.220* -0.049 -0.404 -0.226* -0.059 -0.411 -0.227* -0.058 
(0.325) (0.133) (0.096) (0.298) (0.137) (0.098) (0.298) (0.137) (0.098) 
Government    -0.034 -0.006 0.000 -0.032 -0.007 -0.002 
    (0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.038) (0.028) (0.021) 
Foreign    0.072** 0.037* 0.021 0.075** 0.037* 0.020 
    (0.036) (0.021) (0.016) (0.036) (0.022) (0.017) 
Crisisd,g 0.042 0.080** 0.072** 0.043 0.082** 0.073** 0.062* 0.075* 0.057* 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) 
Government x Crisisd,g       0.069 0.097 0.101 
       (0.053) (0.071) (0.066) 
Foreign x Crisisd,g       -0.050 0.000 0.014 
       (0.055) (0.053) (0.035) 
GDP growth 1.519*** 1.495*** 1.242*** 1.543*** 1.518*** 1.254*** 1.530*** 1.513*** 1.250*** 
 (0.235) (0.277) (0.278) (0.234) (0.277) (0.278) (0.231) (0.277) (0.278) 
Inflation -0.190*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -0.186*** -0.175*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.175*** -0.181***
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) 
Constant 0.141** 0.142** 0.137*** 0.109** 0.138** 0.123*** 0.106** 0.138** 0.123*** 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.035) (0.047) (0.068) (0.037) (0.047) (0.068) (0.038) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 2387 
R2overall 0.367 0.387  0.360 0.388  0.360 0.389  
R2between 0.349 0.412  0.321 0.403  0.320 0.403  
R2within 0.353 0.350  0.357 0.352  0.357 0.352  
Hausman 0.000   0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.106   0.107   0.108 
Hansen J   0.140   0.146   0.146 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Table 9 
Determinansts of foregin bank subsidiaries lending during domestic and global banking crisis 
 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Loans -0.057* 0.067** 0.071* -0.055* 0.065* 0.070* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) 
∆Deposit 0.490*** 0.523*** 0.479*** 0.493*** 0.522*** 0.478*** 
(0.044) (0.038) (0.049) (0.044) (0.038) (0.049) 
Liquidity -0.340** -0.037 -0.180** -0.362*** -0.045 -0.188** 
 (0.136) (0.065) (0.085) (0.135) (0.067) (0.084) 
Profitability 1.457** 0.812 0.693 1.338** 0.803 0.683 
 (0.636) (0.500) (0.556) (0.665) (0.502) (0.559) 
Solvency 0.049 0.028 0.046 0.066 0.034 0.048 
 (0.363) (0.233) (0.211) (0.357) (0.234) (0.213) 
Size 0.392 -0.124 0.058 0.395 -0.120 0.067 
(0.400) (0.146) (0.144) (0.396) (0.146) (0.144) 
Crisisd,g 0.034 0.086 0.046 0.420 0.248** 0.307* 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.043) (0.298) (0.114) (0.178) 
Profitabilityparent -2.345* -0.508 -0.826 -2.044 -0.615 -0.764 
(1.206) (0.643) (0.814) (1.259) (0.726) (0.980) 
Solvencyparent  4.772* 2.366 3.944* 3.498 2.805 3.802 
 (2.569) (1.777) (2.183) (2.355) (2.025) (2.468) 
Sizeparent 0.039 -0.021 -0.038 0.043 -0.013 -0.025 
 (0.104) (0.038) (0.046) (0.105) (0.039) (0.047) 
Profitabilityparent  
x Crisisd,g 
   -5.417 -1.045 -1.910 
   (3.930) (1.516) (1.807) 
Solvencyparent 
 x Crisisd,g 
   17.984 -1.456 0.662 
   (11.527) (3.554) (5.309) 
Sizeparent 
 x Crisisd,g 
   -0.226 -0.275* -0.385** 
   (0.257) (0.145) (0.184) 
GDP growth -1.284*** -1.086*** -1.318*** -1.358*** -1.088*** -1.321*** 
 (0.363) (0.316) (0.333) (0.360) (0.315) (0.331) 
Inflation 0.034 0.086 0.046 0.420 0.248** 0.307* 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.043) (0.298) (0.114) (0.178) 
Constant 0.659*** 0.267* 0.202*** 0.670*** 0.274* 0.191** 
 (0.147) (0.143) (0.074) (0.148) (0.144) (0.081) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
R2overall 0.395 0.489  0.373 0.490  
R2between 0.276 0.612  0.173 0.621  
R2within 0.460 0.436  0.465 0.436  
Hausman 0.000   0.000   
AR2   0.531   0.550 
Hansen J   0.394   0.420 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***,**,*correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
